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Abstract
Many developing countries face a pro-male gender gap in schooling, as boys are more
likely to be enrolled at school than girls. This paper examines whether the current enrol-
ment gap prevails equally both among children with a "regular" and an "irregular" schooling
history. Children with a Regular schooling history are those who completed primary educa-
tion between the ages of 12 and 15 years. Children with an Irregular schooling history are
the rest. We investigate the gender gap in schooling empirically using data provided by the
2001 Cameroon Household Survey. The empirical framework allows for a dierent gender
eect among regular and irregular children. It also accounts for selection into the two groups.
Results show no male-female dierence among regular children. Among irregular children
however, females are more likely to stay out of schools.
Our results suggest that, female children are given a schooling possibility to start with
but are more exposed to dropping out if they display any form of irregularity in the course
of their education.
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It is widely recognized that, irrespective of gender, investments in education have positive eects
on individual income and productivity. Unfortunately, in many developing countries, a pro-male
gender gap is still observed in schooling (Orazem and King, 2008, World-Bank, 2008, Dar et al.,
2002). Closing this gap is a priority for many governments1 and is included in the Millennium
Developments Goals.
The literature has suggested many sources of the gender gap in school enrolment: preference
or parental discrimination (Kingdon, 2002), market incentives such as the male-female dierences
in the opportunity cost of time spent at school and the male-female dierence in future earning
prospects (Kingdon, 1998, Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2006), and social norms about gender roles
in familial relationships (Orazem and King, 2008, Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1982, Lahiri and Self,
2007). The driving forces of the cited gender gap generate a similar gender eect across dierent
groups of children. In particular, a similar gender eect is expected among children who started
their educational process with a delay and those who did not, children who have repeated grades
and those who have not. In this paper we investigate whether the gender gap in school enrolment
is alike among children on one hand, who have experienced late enrolment or who have repeated
grades and on the other hand, children with a regular course of study. Hereafter, we refer to the
words "regular" and "irregular" to identify two groups of children. Regular children are those
who completed primary education between the ages of 12 and 15 years. Irregular children are
the rest, namely children who have not completed primary education by the age of 15. They
have faced at least one of the following irregularities: delayed enrolment, repeating a grade, or
interruption in the course of study.
We use data provided by the 2001 Cameroon Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS)
and examine the gender gap in current school enrolment rates among children aged 12 to 19
years. We start at age 12 for two reasons: (1) in general primary education is completed around
the age of 12, and (2) in our data, there is almost no male-female dierence in school enrolment
rates up to the age of 112. Indeed, in our database 82% of children aged 6 to 11 years old are
enrolled in school and this enrolment rate is split into 83% for boys and 81% for girls3.
To rene the distinction between regular and irregular children, we take advantage of the
fact that in Cameroon, a countrywide exam, called the Primary School Certicate (CEP), is
administered at the end of primary school. This exam takes place on the same days with the
same set of questions for all candidates. Children take this exam when they are around 12 years
old. A child is considered regular if he or she passes the exam by the age of 12 or before the age
of 15 4. Using this criterion, we divide children aged 12 to 15 years into two groups. Regular
1The reduction of the gender gap in education is an important priority in the Poverty Reduction Strategy
Papers of most countries.
2We document this in the paper. We typically suppose that, the current wave of children aged 6 to 11 properly
represents the situation of children aged 12 or more when they were younger (stationarity assumption). We then
show that there is no male female dierence before the age of 11.
3Furthermore, the net enrolment rate in primary school is 78%, with 79% for boys and 77 % for girls (INS and
Macro, 2005).
4We choose 15 years as upper the limit to account for the fact that, around the age of 16, children attend
2children or children with CEP and irregular children or children with no CEP.
As a robustness check, we do a similar analysis with an alternative group of children. The
reference exam is now the secondary school certicate (BEPC) which is organized at the end
of the 10th year of education. Children take this exam when they are around 16. Gender
dierence in school enrolment is investigated among children aged 16 to 19, taking into account
the distinction between those who hold a BEPC and those who do not.
Our empirical framework accounts explicitly for the fact that completing primary education
(success in CEP) is not a purely random realization. It jointly estimates the probability of
having the CEP and the probability of being currently enrolled in school. This approach has
the advantage of controlling for the selection into groups of irregular and regular children. The
main nding is that male-female dierence in school enrolment is observed only among irregular
children. This result suggests that female children are more penalized when they display some
irregularities in their course of study.
From the data, it is not possible to identify the exact economic mechanism driving our
empirical results. However, given our static analytical framework, the results seem to highlight
the role played by the schooling history of a given child. Thus, current schooling decision
may depend on past schooling decisions and past schooling outcomes. For instance, if from
the schooling history, parents realize that their daughter has some schooling irregularities (e.g.
repeating grades), they may anticipate that, additional investment in her education would not
be properly rewarded. However, in the case of a boy, despite the irregularities, they can still
expect good returns. Such gender dierence in perceived return to education can be driven
by the fact that, after the schooling period, females often get married and do housework (non
income generating activities) while males males hardly do so.
The contribution of this paper is the light it sheds on the role played by children's schooling
history on their probabilities of being currently enrolled in school. It suggests that, independently
of the source of the gender dierence, the pro-male gender gap in school enrolment seems to be
important mainly among children who have had some schooling irregularities. Thus, reducing
sources of schooling irregularities such as late enrolment and repeating grades should be added
to the set of policies suggested by Glick (2008) to reduce the schooling gender gap.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the analytical framework and discusses
the role played by schooling history. Section 3 describes the data, provides evidence on the
absence of a gender gap among children under the age of 11 and develops the empirical model.
Section 4 provides the main estimation results. Section 5 discusses alternative mechanisms to
interpret the results while Section 5 gives some concluding comments.
another exam which is considered separately in the paper. Further, and a more general observation, in Cameroon
a child is not allowed to repeat the same grade 3 times in the same public school.
32 Analytical framework of gender gap in schooling
This section presents a model for school length. The household has two children: one son and
one daughter. The life of a child is divided into two periods. The rst is devoted entirely to
education and the second is devoted to working. Parents decide on the amount of time their
ospring spend at school. We denote the schooling time of child i by Ei and his or her working
time by Ti. The common retirement age R is dened by : R = Ei + Ti. The index i takes the
value m for male and f for female.
We suppose that there is no intra-household competition over resources (Garg and Morduch,
1998) and that the parents have perfect access to credit. Education is regarded as a risk-free
investment (Kodde, 1986). Its cost, which is gender specic, is constant and denoted by ci.
The cost is composed of direct schooling costs (tuition fee, uniforms, books, transportation,
etc.) and the opportunity cost of the child's time that is devoted to education. Parents care
about education because they are altruistic. Their schooling decisions reect a tradeo between
schooling costs and future earnings (Baland and Robinson, 2000, Bedi and Marshall, 2002).
The utility of the parent depends on the wellbeing of his children and the cost of sending
them to school. In a household with a boy and a girl, the utility is written as follows:
Wp = mUm(Em;Tm;m) + fUf(Ef;Tf;f)   (cmEm + cfEf) (1)
where Ui is the utility of child i. The parameters i represent the altruism coecient of the
parent towards the son and the daughter. The parameters i summarize the schooling histories.
They are known at the time of the current schooling decisions and reect schooling irregularities
(late enrolment, grades repeating, interruptions) in the child's history. Children who started
their educational process at the age of 6 and advance one grade every year have higher value of
.
The utility of the child depends on , on the total amount of time spent at school and on
the amount of time devoted to income generating activities or housework afterward. A boy
spends his entire working time on income generating activities. His productivity is dened by
Qm(Em;m). We assume that the marginal return to schooling is strictly positive and strictly
decreasing (Qm
Em > 0, Qm
EmEm < 0)5. We also suppose that the return to regularity is positive
and that the return to education increases with regularity (Qm
m > 0, Qm
Emm > 0). The utility
of the boy is dened by the following:
Um = Qm(Em;m)Tm = Qm(Em;m)(R   Em) (2)
Unlike a boy, a girl devotes part of her working time to housework. She chooses the amount
of time, denoted t, that she spends on household activities such as child care6, cooking and
5This assumption is common in the literature, for example (Orazem and King, 2008, Baland and Robinson,
2000, Bommier and Lambert, 2000).
6Child care is considered broadly to include maternity leave.
4housekeeping7. The productivity of a girl is dened by Qf(Ef;f) and her utility function is
written as:
Uf = Qf(Ef;Tf;f) = Qf(Ef;f)(R   Ef   t) + u(t) (3)
where t is the amount of time spent on housework. We assume that u is positive and concave
with u(0)=0 and u0(0) = +1. We also assume that the features of the productivity function
of a girl (Qf) are similar to those of a boy (Qm). The choice of t is optimal and satises the
following rst order condition:
 Qf(Ef;f) + u0(t) = 0 (4)
This equation means that, the marginal cost of spending time on housework is Qf(Ef;f)
and the marginal gain is u'(t) for the daughter.
Parents decide on the amount of time the son and the daughter will spend at school to









Qf(Ef;f)(R   Ef   t) + u(t)
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 (cmEm + cfEf) (5)








(R   Ef   t)   fQf(Ef;f)   cf = 0 (7)
These equations imply that, parents keep children at school until the marginal benet equals
the marginal cost. The gain is related to an increase in productivity induced by an additional
year spent at school. The marginal cost involves both direct cost ci and the opportunity cost
since additional time spent at school reduces the amount of time spent on income generating
activities.
This framework is general and can generate, under plausible assumptions, many often cited
sources of systematic gender gap in schooling8. For instance, holding other factors to be the same




then there will be a pro-male gender gap in schooling. Similarly, if the cost of schooling is higher
for females (cf > cm) all else being equal, then the daughter will receive less schooling. Finally
7Hersch and Stratton (1997) provide a detail list of housework activities.
8See Alderman and King (1998), Glick (2008) and others.
5if because of some cultural factors or social norms, the empathy of parents is higher for the
son than for the daughter (m > f)9, then all being else equal, the daughter will receive less
education.
We now impose no gender dierence in empathy (m = f), in the cost of education (cf =
cm) and in productivity (Qf = Qm). In this case, the quality of the schooling history () and
the choice of time devoted to housework remain the only sources of the gender gap in schooling.
Proposition 1 If the son and the daughter have identical schooling histories the daughter will
receive less education only if she would participate in housework.
Proof. We rewrite equations (6) and (7) as follows:
QE(Em;)(R   Em)   Q(Em;)   c = 0 (8)
QE(Ef;)(R   Ef   t)   Q(Ef;)   c = 0 (9)
If t = 0, the equalities in equations (8) and (9) are satised only if Ef = Em. So the son
and the daughter will spend the same amount of time at school. If t > 0, equalities (8) and (9)
hold simultaneously if and only if
QE(Em;)(R   Em)   Q(Em;) = c
and
QE(Ef;)(R   Ef)   Q(Ef;) = c + QE(Ef;)t
We have that c + QE(Ef;)t  c. So Ef  Em because the function QE(x;)(R   x)   Q(x;)
is decreasing in x.
Proposition 2 If the elasticity of the return to education with respect to the schooling history
() is smaller than the elasticity of time devoted to housework with respect to , then a marginal
improvement in schooling history will have a bigger eect on the education of the daughter.







The consequence of this proposition is that, if parents realize that their daughter has some
irregularities in her schooling process, they would anticipate that, after her schooling period,
she would devote a larger part of her working time to housework. The additional amount of
time devoted to education would then not be properly rewarded. If on the contrary, they realize
that their daughter is doing well at school, they will anticipate that, after her schooling period,
she will spend a larger amount of time on income generating activities and will keep investing
9The preferences of parents are biased. They have a "taste for discrimination" Becker (1971).
6in her education. This mechanism is not at work for a son because he barely participates in
housework.
Proof. The proof is in the appendix.
3 Data, econometric model and model specication
3.1 Data
We use data from the 2001 Living Standard Measurement Survey in Cameroon. The sample had
11,000 households. The data provides information on the current enrolment status of children, on
their highest grade completed and on the certicates they have. From the data, we can identify
the stage of education of each child in 2001. The cameroonian educational system consists of four
stages: primary, secondary, post secondary and university. At the end of primary school (grade
6), students have to take the primary schooling certicate (CEP). The CEP is a countrywide
exam administered independently by the Ministry of Basic Eduction. It takes place during the
same days with the same set of questions for all candidates. Children take this exam when
they are around 12 years old. A similar exam, called the secondary school certicate (BEPC),
is organized at the end of secondary school. Children who have progressed regularly through
school take the BEPC exam when they are around 16 years old.
Figure 1: Dierence between male and female current enrolment rates: 6-11 years old
The dashed lines indicate a 95% condence interval.
3.1.1 Choice of the sample
To get to the end of primary education, children must have been enrolled over 5 years and must
have successfully completed the corresponding grades. Figure 1 shows the dierence in male
and female current enrolment rates by age and the 95% condence interval. The lower bound
of the condence interval is negative up to the age of 10. Under a stationarity assumption, this
7gure suggests that, the male-female dierence in current enrolment rates observed in the data
is not signicant before the age of 11.
Table 1: Odds ratio and current enrolment rates by gender and age: 6-19 years
Current enrolment rates
Age All Female Male Di (M-F) Odds (F/M)
6 0.60 0.59 0.61 1.9 0.92
7 0.78 0.77 0.78 1.6 0.91
8 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.001 1.00
9 0.88 0.86 0.90 3.5 0.72
10 0.89 0.87 0.90 3 0.73
11 0.92 0.90 0.95 4.6* 0.51
12 0.87 0.83 0.90 6.7*** 0.55
13 0.86 0.83 0.88 4.9** 0.67
14 0.83 0.79 0.86 7.3*** 0.60
15 0.75 0.72 0.78 5.8** 0.73
16 0.72 0.66 0.78 11.9*** 0.55
17 0.60 0.54 0.66 11.9*** 0.61
18 0.50 0.43 0.58 15.1*** 0.54
19 0.46 0.38 0.54 16*** 0.52
Di (M-F) is the dierence in male and female percentages. Odds (M/F) is the female over male ratio of the odds of
enrolment rates. ** Signicant at 5% and * Signicant at 10%..
Table 2: Percentage of Children With No Delay: 6-19 years
% of children with no delay
Age All Female Male Di (M-F) Odds(F/M)
6
7 99 99 99 0.10 1.00
8 87 87 88 1.00 1.00
9 84 83 85 2.40 1.00
10 79 79 79 0.40 1.00
11 74 74 74 0.60 1.00
12 64 64 65 1.00 1.00
13 61 63 58 -4.6* 1.00
14 51 54 49 -4.40 1.00
15 45 46 45 -0.80 1.00
16 45 42 47 4.40 1.00
17 36 35 37 1.60 1.00
18 27 24 30 6** 1.01
19 22 19 25 6.4** 1.01
Di (M-F) is the dierence in male and female percentages. ** Signicant at 5% and * Signicant at 10%. The odds ratio
(Odds (M/F)) is the female over male ratio of the odds of percentages.
We observed however a signicant dierence in male and female enrolment rates after the
age of 10 and exceeding 6% from the age of 12 onward (Table 1).
Even if male and female children are equally likely to be enrolled in the early years of
primary education, they might evolve at dierent rhythms. Table 2 shows the percentage of
children with some form of schooling irregularities by age. Irregularities are summarized here
with schooling delays. A delay can be due to enrolling late , repeating grades or dropping out.
It is dened with respect to the theoretical number of completed grades given the age of the
child. The theoretical number of completed grades for a child aged 7 is one, given that he or she
is supposed to have started primary education at age 6. The theoretical number of completed
8grades of elder children is dened accordingly10. This table suggests that, on average, male and
female children are equally likely to have a delay in schooling, and if anything, females are better
o.
The percentage of children with no schooling delay is about 80% up to the age
of 10, and it drops sharply to about 65% at the age of 12.
Table 3 shows the current enrolment rates of children who have experienced a delay and those
who have not in the course of their schooling process. Enrolment rates are lower among children
with a schooling delay. There is no gender dierence in school enrolment among children with
no schooling delay. However, among children with a schooling delay, a signicant (5%) gender
dierence appears at the age of 10. From this age onward, female children in this group seem
to be less likely to be enrolled at school.
Table 3: Odds Ratio And Current Enrolment Rates By Gender And Age: 6-19 Years With And
Without Delay
Children with a delay Children with no delay
Cur. enrolment rate Odds Cur. enrolment rate Odds
AGE Fem Male Di(M-F) Ratio Fem Male Di(M-F) Ratio
6
7 - - - - 77 78 1.70 1.000
8 1.1 1.2 0.1 3.000 97 96 -1 1.000
9 27 39 12* 1.012 98 98 0.00 1.000
10 44 60 17*** 1.006 99 98 -0.8 1.000
11 68 81 13*** 1.002 98 99 1.5* 1.000
12 60 78 18*** 1.004 97 97 0.07 1.000
13 62 78 16*** 1.003 96 95 -0.4 1.000
14 63 77 14*** 1.003 93 96 2.70 1.000
15 51 64 13*** 1.004 98 96 -2.6 1.000
16 45 63 18*** 1.006 95 95 0.05 1.000
17 32 49 17*** 1.011 94 95 1.04 1.000
18 26 43 17*** 1.015 93 91 -2.3 1.000
19 26 41 14*** 1.014 88 94 6.07 1.001
Di (M-F) is the dierence in male and female percentages. *** signicant at 1% and * signicant at 10%. The odds ratio
is the female over male ratio of the odds of enrolment rates. A child has a delay if his or her number of completed year of
education is lower than the theoretical number of grades he or she must have completed given his or her age.
The denition of schooling delay used in Tables (2) and (3) relies on schools specic re-
quirements for moving from one grade to the next. The standards are potentially dierent from
one school to another. To use a common standard, we rely on a national standardized exams.
We consider for instance, that a child has completed primary education if he or has passed the
national exam administered at the end of primary education (CEP). The quality of schooling
history is then summarized by holding or not a certicate, outcome of these country-wide exams.
3.1.2 The sample
A child who starts primary school at the age of 6 and advances one grade every year will
completed primary education by the age of 12. Our sample, therefore, consists of children aged
12 to 19 years. It contains 9,585 children and is divided into two sub-populations: children of 12
10It is actually the number of grades the child would have completed at the time of the survey, had he or she
entered at age 6 and advanced one grade each year.
9to 15 (53%) and children of 16 to 19 years old. Children aged 12 to 15 who have not completed
primary education are called irregular children. They have got up to 3 extra years to pass the
CEP exam. Not completing primary education by this age indicates that such a child have
either repeated grades, started schooling late11 or dropped out earlier. Similarly, children aged
16 to 19 years who have not passed the BEPC are called irregular children.
The total enrolment rate in our sample is 71% and is unequally split between males and
females. Of the males, 76% are enrolled at school whereas 66% females are enrolled. The
enrolment rate is 83% among children aged 12 to 15 years and is lower among children aged
16 to 19 years, about 57%. Figure 2 depicts the dierence between male and female enrolment
rate by age as well as the 95% condence interval around it. Figure 2a shows the dierence
for the sample as a whole. It indicates that male-female dierences are signicantly positive
for all ages considered. As observed in African countries by Orazem and King (2008), the
dierence increases with age. Figure 2b plots the same dierence for irregular children. It shows
a similar positive dierence that increases with age. However, the dierence is not observed
among children aged 12 to 17 who passed the CEP exam. Figure 2c shows that the dierence is
not signicantly dierent from zero up to 17 years old and that it becomes positive only at the
age of 18 and 19. The positive dierence observed in this last part of the graph (ages 18 and 19)
is not very surprising. It corresponds to the situation that exits 6 to 7 years after some children
have got their CEP, which is long enough to indicate how far they can go in school, namely if
they can pass the BEPC or not.
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 2: Male-Female Dierences in Enrolment Rates: Children Aged 12 to 19
11Bommier and Lambert (2000) and Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (1997) studied late enrolment or delayed
enrolment.
10Figure 3 shows the dierence between male and female enrolment rates by age for children
aged 16 to 19 as well as the 95% condence interval around it. Children with and without the
BEPC are also considered separately. In this case as well, the gender eect is driven by the
dierence among irregular children.
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 3: Male-Female dierences in enrolment rates: children aged 16 to 19
The reference exam in this gure is the BEPC and the age group is 16-19.
Table 4 presents enrolment rates by gender and age groups. It indicates that, on average,
being a boy signicantly increases the likelihood of being enrolled at school. If we divide the
sample with respect to schooling regularity, we observe higher enrolment rates and no gender
dierence among regular children. In contrast, irregular children have lower enrolment rates and
display a signicant gender dierences in enrolment rates. So the gender gap observed seems to
be driven mainly by the dierences observed among irregular children.
Table 4: Enrolment Rates By Gender And Age Group
Age 12-15 Age 16-19
All Irregular Regular All Irregular Regular
Female 79.8 70.1 93.8 50.5 44.8 93.0
Male 85.8 81.9 92.2 64.5 59.3 92.2
Male-Female 6.0*** 11.8*** -1.6 14.0*** 14.5*** -0.8
The enrolment rate of the 12-15 group is 83%. The enrolment rate of children in the age group 16-19 is is 57%. ***
Signicant at 1%. Male-Female is the dierence between male and female enrolment rates. All indicates all children of the
age group considered. Irregular means those who do not have the CEP certicate among the 12-15. Among the 16-19, it
means those who do not have the BEPC certicate. Regular means those who have the CEP certicate among the 12-15.
Among the 16-19, it means those who have the BEPC certicate. We do not exclude children aged 16 to 19 who do not
have the CEP certicate. If they had been excluded, we would have observed a change in the magnitude of the dierence
but not a change in the pattern.
11Table 5 shows the allocation of the sample by gender. It suggests that patterns of gender
dierence in enrolment rates are not driven by the gender structure of the sample. Actually, the
results are reproduced in two sub-samples with dierent gender structures. In the rst, children
aged 12 to 15, males and females are equally represented and the proportion of irregular children
is higher among males. In the second, children aged 16 to 19, there are slightly more females
and the proportion of irregular children is higher among females.
Table 5: Allocation by gender
Age 12-15 Age 16-19
% in sample % Irregular % sample % Irregular
Female 50 57 51 84
Male 50 61 49 79
Total 100 41 100 18
Male-Female 4*** -5***
% in sample is the percentage of males and females in the sample . % Irregular is the percentage of irregular children in the sub samples of
males and females. Male-Female is the dierence between the male and the female percentages. *** Signicant at 1%.
3.2 Econometric model
We measure the quality of the schooling history with a dichotomous variable. In one group, there
are children with irregular schooling histories and in the other, children with regular schooling
histories. The objective of this section is then to provide an econometric framework that allows
us to test whether the male-female dierence in school enrolment exists within the two groups
of children.
Regular and irregular children are at dierent stage of education. For instance, irregular
children of 12 to 15 years have not completed primary education, whereas regular children have.
Regarding school enrolment, the former are to be enrolled in primary school while the latter are
to be enrolled in secondary school12. Figure 4 illustrates the structure of the modeling strategy.
If being regular were a pure random even, then the probability of being enrolled in school
would be independent of the probability of being a regular child. The selection into the two
regularity groups would be ignored and the econometric framework would consist of estimating
binary choice models. However, this possibility is unrealistic. Children from dierent families
have dierent probabilities of attending or of passing exams at given age (Cameron and Heckman,
2001, Mare, 1980, Dreze and Kingdon, 2001). The selection into the groups of children should
be explicitly taken into account.
We use the structure provided by Figure 4 to describe the econometric framework. Let
YR be a binary variable indicating whether a child is regular or not. Let Y1 and Y2 be two
binary variables representing the school enrolment decisions for irregular and regular children
respectively. The variable Y1 (respectively Y2) is relevant only when the variable YR takes the
value 0 (respectively 1). The probabilities to be enrolled are given by the following:
12Ten children in the data were in secondary school and did not have the CEP. They were excluded from the
sample.
12Figure 4: A model of school enrolment of children aged 12 to 15
A indicates irregular children who are not currently enrolled. B indicates irregular children who are currently
enrolled. C indicates regular children who are not currently enrolled. D indicates regular children who are
currently enrolled.
P(B) = P(Y1 = 1 j YR = 0)  P(YR = 0)
= P(Y1 = 1;YR = 0)
P(D) = P(Y2 = 1 j YR)  P(YR = 1)
= P(Y2 = 1;YR = 1)
Let us dene Y 






j  Femalei + X
0
jij + uji
where i indicates individuals, j = (0
j;F
j ;j) is the vector of parameters, Zj = (1;Female;Xj)
is the set of regressors, and uji is the unobserved error term. Female is a dummy variable that
takes the value 1 for females. We assume that uji  N(0;1).
The outcomes of being irregular and of being enrolled are observed on the same child. They
are related by a child specic unobserved heterogeneity (Lillard and Willis, 1994, Pal, 2004).
Therefore, uRi and u1i are correlated. Similarly uRi and u2i are correlated. We denote the
correlation coecients by: corr(uRi;u1i) = 1 and corr(uRi;u2i) = 2.
This formulation is general and leaves open the possibility that dierent sets of regressors
determine enrolment for both irregular and regular children. It also leaves open the possibility
that, a given regressor may dierently aect the likelihood of being enrolled for a child among
the irregular group and a child among the regular group. We indeed expect the gender eect to
be dierent for irregular and regular children. We will test the hypothesis that F
1 is signicant
13and negative whereas F
2 is not signicantly dierent from zero. The assumption that the gender
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j. The index j takes the values 1 or 2. The symbol l, (l= R, 1, 2),
denotes a "sign" variable and is dened by l = 2Yl 1 for each observation. The 2 by 2 matrices
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jtk dened by 
j11 = 
j22 = 1 and 
j12 = 
j21 = j1j.
The log-likelihood function of observations is:
L = n
i 1iAlog(PiA) + 1iBlog(PiB) + 1iClog(PiC) + 1iDlog(PiD) (10)
where 1ix = 1fxg is an indicator function with x =A,B,C,D.
The identication of this model relies on the set of variables indicating the supply of schools
and the nonlinearities of the functional form used13 (Wooldridge, 2002).
If we assume that there is no child specic unobserved heterogeneity, we would have that
1 = 2 = 0 which implies that uR, u1 and u2 are independent. The parameters R, 1 and 2
could be estimated with three simple probit models.
3.3 Model specication
Section 2 indicates that, the probability of being enrolled in school is aected not only by gender
but also by other factors. To separate out the eects of these factors, it is necessary to specify
a model with a suitable set of explanatory variables.
Participation in the labor market: Child labor is seen as an opportunity cost of child's
time that is devoted to schooling. It is therefore appropriate to use some demand factors of child
labor as control variables. The rst set of such variables is related to the demand for child labor
originating from the household. In general the activities the household engages in, shape the
demand for child labor within the household. As a result, we use covariates indicating activities
of the head of the household or his spouse: non-wage worker, self employed in agriculture or in
trader. These variables indicate respectively whether the head of small business.
Basu (1998) suggests that child labor and adult labor are substitutes for one another. Thus
the extent of local job opportunities for children can be provided by the local adult participation
rate in the labor market. Adults local participation rates in labor market14 and in the informal
sector are used as regressors in the schooling equations. These participation rates also reect
the demand factors for child labor originating from outside the household15 and the extent of
future job opportunities (Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1982). In addition, we expect that child labor
occurs mainly in the informal sector.
13This is similar to what is commonly done with the probit selection equation of non-response that lead to
missing data.
14Pal (2004) uses this variable for a study on school attainment in Peru.
15Fafchamps and Wahba (2006) show that children living in or near cities are more likely to work.
14Table 6: Descriptive Statistics Of The Variables Used
AGE 12-19 AGE 12-15 AGE 16-19
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Age 15.34 2.28 13.46 1.13 17.44 1.09
Female 0.50 0.50 0.51
Head has primary level 0.35 0.35 0.35
Head has secondary level 0.33 0.32 0.35
Head has university level 0.07 0.07 0.08
Head sex (Male=1) 0.78 0.78 0.77
Age of head 46.15 13.18 47.23 12.56 44.95 13.75
Muslim 0.39 0.38 0.41
Christian 0.69 0.68 0.71
Estimated expenditure per capita 3.14 3.13 2.91 3.09 3.39 3.15
Rural 0.28 0.31 0.25
Head or spouse non wage worker 0.67 0.69 0.65
Head or spouse (non wage) in agri 0.40 0.43 0.36
Head or spouse (non wage) in trade 0.21 0.21 0.22
Son/daughter of head 0.65 0.72 0.57
Distance to private primary school 2.28 4.72 2.46 4.92 2.08 4.48
Distance to public primary school 1.06 1.88 1.13 2.08 0.99 1.61
Distance to private secondary school 4.07 6.06 4.37 6.27 3.74 5.80
Distance to public secondary school 3.64 4.98 3.87 5.17 3.38 4.74
Local participation to labor market 0.71 0.17 0.72 0.17 0.70 0.17
Local participation rate to informal sector 0.43 0.21 0.45 0.22 0.42 0.21
# of 0-5 years 1.07 1.26 1.13 1.28 1.00 1.23
# of male of 6-11 years 0.73 0.96 0.81 1.01 0.63 0.89
# of female of 6-11 years 0.69 0.94 0.77 0.98 0.60 0.90
# of male of 12-15 years 0.71 0.82 0.93 0.84 0.48 0.72
# of female of 12-15 years 0.72 0.84 0.93 0.86 0.50 0.75
# of male of 16-19 years 0.66 0.85 0.45 0.74 0.90 0.91
# of female of 16-19 years 0.62 0.76 0.42 0.67 0.85 0.79
# of male of 20-35 years 0.63 0.96 0.54 0.92 0.73 1.00
# of female of 20-35 years 0.70 0.87 0.73 0.86 0.67 0.88
# of over 35 years 1.56 1.03 1.63 1.00 1.49 1.06
N 9585 5067 4518
The mean of a dummy variable is proportion.
15Supply side variables: One needs to control for school supply-side factors on enrolment
decisions (Bedi and Marshall, 2002, Dreze and Kingdon, 2001). They reect school quality,
school proximity and cost (Behrman et al., 2008). Public primary school is free in Cameroon
and tuition fees in public secondary school are identical across the country. Thus the relevant
discriminating part of the cost of education is related to transportation cost and other schooling
direct costs (uniforms, books, PTA fees,etc.). The data provide only the distance to the nearest
primary or secondary school but not other school quality characteristics. If we assume that
transportation costs are related to distance, we can proxy transportation cost by the distance to
the nearest school. We consider separately the distance to a public school and a private school
to reect the dierences in these two types of schools. We further distinguish the distance to a
primary and a secondary school to reect dierences in the supply of the two levels of education.
In our sample, the average distance to a public primary school for a given child is 1 kilometer.
He or she needs to walk on average one more kilometer to reach the nearest private primary
school. In general secondary schools are located farther away than primary ones. A child needs
to walk, on average, 2 to 3 additional kilometers to reach a secondary school.
The residential location (urban or rural) children in a developing country may reect the
quality of the local public services to which they have access. Well trained teachers prefer
working in cities rather than in villages, therefore distorting the quality of services oered by
schools.
Household resource constraints: In a country with an imperfect credit market, household
resource constraints play an important role in school investments (Baland and Robinson, 2000,
Basu, 1998). We expect children from credit constrained households, actually poor households,
to have a lower probability of attending school. The data does not provide information on
credit constraints. They do however contain household expenditures which is considered to be
an indicator for the household's standard of living. But household expenditures are potentially
related to schooling decisions in a household model. Consequently, we use predicted values16
instead of the actual values, of household expenditure per capita.
Household preferences and structure: Section 2 noted the importance of parental pref-
erences on schooling decisions. These preferences are dicult to quantify. Therefore, the edu-
cation level of parents is used to capture their attitude towards schooling decisions.
Finally, we control for the structure of the household in terms of the number of household
member per age group(Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 1997). We consider separately the number
of females and males in the schooling age groups. This allow us to capture dierential eect
related to their presence in the household (Garg and Morduch, 1998). Further the number
of adults in the households controls for the number of economically active family members
(Manacorda, 2006).
The summary statistics of selected regressors classied by age groups are shown by Table 11
in the appendix.
16The identifying instruments were head of household characteristics, household structure, durable goods owned,
geographical dummies, usable land owned. The adjusted R-squared of the OLS regression is 0.3.
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The model shown in equation 10 is estimated on children aged 12-1517. Estimated coecients
are shown in Table 7. The coecients 21 and 31 are signicantly dierent from zero. This
suggests that child specic heterogeneity is signicant. We then conclude that ignoring the
correlation structure of the data would give rise to inconsistent estimates.
The coecient on gender is signicantly negative for irregular children. This means that an
irregular female aged 12 to 15 is less likely to be enrolled at school. In contrast, the coecient
on gender is positive and non signicant for regular children. So, the eect of gender on the like-
lihood of being enrolled in school is not signicantly dierent from zero among regular children
aged 12 to 15. If it has any eect, it would be to increase the likelihood that the female will be
enrolled. The coecient on gender in the column labeled regular in Table 7 is not signicant. It
suggests that gender plays no role in the division into groups of regular and irregular children.
As a robustness check, we estimate the model on children aged 16 to 19. Estimated co-
ecients are presented in Table 9 in the appendix. Here as well, the gender eect on school
enrolment is signicant only for irregular children.
Table 7: Estimated Coecients of the Joint Model on Children Aged 12
to 15.
Regularity is based on CEP exam.
Regular Enroll irregular Enroll regular
Age 0.368 -0.198 0.178
(19.79)*** (4.15)*** (2.09)**
Female 0.090 -0.411 0.128
(1.47) (4.74)*** (1.32)
Head has primary level 0.457 0.717 0.281
(7.15)*** (9.98)*** (2.02)**
Head has secondary level 0.868 1.090 0.732
(11.51)*** (10.24)*** (4.75)***
Head has university level 1.052 1.140 0.873
(9.19)*** (5.18)*** (3.90)***
Head sex (Male=1) -0.232 -0.449 -0.047
(4.33)*** (5.61)*** (0.45)
Age of head 0.012 0.010 0.013
(5.20)*** (3.46)*** (3.75)***
Muslim 0.004 -0.146 0.070
(0.09) (1.80)* (0.90)
Christian 0.375 0.833 0.376
(6.57)*** (10.73)*** (3.96)***
Continued on Next Page...
17The results of the model estimated on children age 16 to 19 is in Table 9 in the appendix. We also estimated
the model on the pool sample of all children. We keep the denition of irregular children in the process and
consider enrolment more generally. The results (not shown here) on gender eect were qualitatively similar to
those presented in this paper.
17Table 7 { Continued
Regular Enroll irregular Enroll regular
Estimated expenditure per head 0.070 0.053 0.079
(6.36)*** (2.74)*** (4.56)***
Rural -0.040 -0.033 0.047
(0.56) (0.36) (0.39)
Head or spouse non-wage worker -0.057 0.001 -0.245
(0.84) (0.01) (2.08)**
Head or spouse (non-wage) in agri -0.108 -0.067 0.092
(1.50) (0.71) (0.70)
Head or spouse (non-wage) in trade -0.106 -0.080 -0.031
(1.60) (0.92) (0.30)
Son/daughter of head 0.064 0.381 0.343
(1.37) (5.81)*** (3.29)***
Distance to private primary school -0.037 -0.011
(5.31)*** (1.87)*
Distance to public primary school -0.017 -0.021
(0.96) (1.96)**
Distance to private secondary school -0.005 0.003
(0.88) (0.26)
Distance to public secondary school -0.034 -0.080
(4.43)*** (5.54)***
Local participation to labor market -0.168 0.074 -0.711
(0.96) (0.31) (2.24)**
Local participation rate to informal sector -0.044 -0.054 -0.053
(0.33) (0.36) (0.24)
# of 0-5 years -0.035 0.003 -0.000
(1.75)* (0.13) (0.00)
# of male of 6-11 years 0.016 0.018 -0.032
(0.70) (0.67) (0.80)
# of female of 6-11 years 0.039 0.004 0.067
(1.66)* (0.15) (1.67)*
# of male of 12-15 years 0.066 0.063 0.063
(2.05)** (1.44) (1.20)
# of female of 12-15 years 0.043 -0.004 0.067
(1.32) (0.08) (1.30)
# of male of 16-19 years 0.033 0.012 0.075
(1.13) (0.28) (1.55)
# of female of 16-19 years 0.093 0.044 0.065
(2.92)*** (0.94) (1.25)
# of male of 20-35 years -0.006 0.051 -0.005
(0.27) (1.39) (0.15)
# of female of 20-35 years 0.035 0.029 -0.024
(1.29) (0.79) (0.50)
# of over 35 years -0.022 0.100 -0.037
(0.79) (2.73)*** (0.82)
Constant -6.345 2.205 -3.261
Continued on Next Page...
18Table 7 { Continued












2(1) = 18 p=0.000
The dependent variables Regular, Enroll irregular and Enroll regular are all dummy variables. Regular takes value
1 if the child is considered regular. Enroll irregular takes value 1 if the Irregular child is enrolled in school. Enroll
regular takes value 1 if the regular child is enrolled in school. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. *
signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
5 Discussion
Section 2 suggests one plausible mechanism to explain why the gender gap in current enrollment
is observed only among irregular children. If, from the schooling history, the parents realize
that their daughter shows some irregularities in her school progression rhythm, they would
anticipate that, after her schooling period, she would devote a larger part of her working time
to housework. Further investment in her education would therefore not be properly rewarded.
Parents would then have a lower incentive to keep investing in her education. Table 818 provides
indirect evidence of this mechanism. It shows the average number of hours devoted to income
generating activities over a month. It suggests that, on average, male and female children who
were regular at school indeed spent the same amount of time in income generating activities
after their schooling period. Female who were irregular spent on average a lower amount of time
on income generating activities. However, gures in this table are not exempt of bias due to the
determinants of occupational choice (Banerjee and Newman, 1993). We can therefore think of
two other possible mechanisms.
Table 8: Number of Hours Devoted to Income Generating Activities over a Month
20 - 24 years
Female Male
CEP Weak 35 46
Able 39 48
Regular-Irregular 4* 2
BEPC Weak 36 47
Able 42 45
Regular-Irregular 6* 2
First, one might think that parents under-invest in a female's education from the age of
18
196 onward and that what we observe at the age of 12 is simply the continuation of what has
started many years earlier. This scenario corresponds to having female education costs higher
than male education costs. In this case, we would then have a pro male gender gap in school
enrolment at every age. But Tables 1 and 3 suggest that, under the stationarity assumption,
there is not gender gap in current enrolment rate before the age of 10. Furthermore, when the
gender dierence appears, it is observed only among children that have shown some schooling
irregularities. By the same token, the possibility that parents invest more in female education
when the child is at an early age is not very plausible.
Second, the (opportunity) cost of schooling might be the same for males and females around
the age of 6 but it becomes higher for females around the age of 12. If this were the case,
all female children would face the same cost around the age of 12 and they would all be less
likely to be enrolled at school. We would then observe a gender gap both among irregular and
regular children. However, we have observed a gender gap in current enrolment rates only among
irregular children(see Figure 2). This reasoning suggests that, dierence in cost is not a driving
force in our results.
We have assumed in the empirical model (section 3.2) that a child specic heterogeneity
aects both schooling regularity and enrolment. If this hypothesis is relaxed, then u1 and uR
are independent. The error terms uR and u2 are independent as well. Estimating model 10 is
reduced to estimating two independent probit models. Table 10 in the appendix presents the
corresponding estimation results. They show some dierences compared to the initial results
reported on table 7. For instance, on the role played by the education of household head or the
indicator of family wealth19. However the message on gender gap is not altered.
One limitation of our data is that they do not provide the exact year at which children
passed their exams. It is not possible to know when a child, say of 15 years old, succeeded the
CEP exam. Moreover, we do not know how an irregular child, say of 13 years old, would fare
the next year. Thus with our denition of regularity, a child aged 15 who passed the CEP when
he was 14 years old is classied as regular whereas a child aged 13 who did not have the CEP
is classied as irregular. We check that our result is robust to the denition of regularity by
estimating the model only on children aged 14 and only on children aged 17. The results, not
shown, remain similar.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines the gender dierence in the likelihood of being enrolled at school. The
current literature suggests that in many African countries, male children are more likely to be
enrolled at school than are females. It treats identically children who have dierent schooling
histories. We have introduced an approach that consists of allowing a dierent gender eect
on the probability of being enrolled in school for children with dierent schooling histories. We
study current enrolment among regular and irregular children. Regular children are those who
19They have minor eect on the probability of being enrolled in secondary school (Mare, 1980).
20completed primary education between the ages of 12 and 15.
Our econometric framework accounts explicitly for selection of children into the groups of
regular and irregular children. It jointly estimates the probability of being a regular child and
being currently enrolled. We estimate this model a cameroonian database. The particularity
of this country is that, there is a weak male-female dierence in current enrolment rate among
young children (6-10 years).
Results of the estimated model show no male-female dierence in the likelihood of being
enrolled in school among regular children. However, among irregular children, females are less
likely to be enrolled in school than are males.
While enrolment has become less problematic for very young children, dropping out of school
remains important for children aged 12 or more, especially female. Our results suggest that,
female children are given a schooling possibility to start with but are more exposed to dropping
out if they display any form of irregularity in the course of their education. Therefore, one way
to reduce the gender gap in current school enrolment would be to reduce grade repetition, in
particular, female grade repetition.
21References
Alderman, H. and King, E. M. (1998). Gender dierences in parental investment in education.
Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 9(4):453{468.
Baland, J.-M. and Robinson, J. A. (2000). Is child labor inecient? Journal of Political
Economy, 108(4):663{679.
Banerjee, A. V. and Newman, A. F. (1993). Occupational choice and the process of development.
Journal of Political Economy, 101(2):274{98.
Basu, K. & Van, P. H. (1998). The economics of child labor. The American Economic Review,
88 (3):412{427.
Becker, G. S. (1971). The Economics of Discrimination. The University of Chicago Press,
Chicago.
Bedi, A. S. and Marshall, J. H. (2002). Primary school attendance in honduras. Journal of
Development Economics, 69(1):129{153.
Behrman, J. R., Ross, D., and Sabot, R. (2008). Improving quality versus increasing the quan-
tity of schooling: Estimates of rates of return from rural pakistan. Journal of Development
Economics, 85(1-2):94{104.
Bommier, A. and Lambert, S. (2000). Education demand and age at school enrollment in
tanzania. The Journal of Human Resources, 35(1):177{203.
Cameron, S. V. and Heckman, J. J. (2001). The dynamics of educational attainment for blacks,
hispanics, and whites. Journal of Political Economy, 109.
Dar, A., Blunch, N.-H., Kim, B., and Sasaki, M. (2002). Participation of children in schooling
and labor activities: A review of empirical studies. Social protection discusion paper 0221,
World Bank.
Dreze, J. and Kingdon, G. G. (2001). School participation in rural india. Review of Development
Economics, 5(1):1{24.
Fafchamps, M. and Wahba, J. (2006). Child labour, urban proximity, and household composi-
tion. Journal of Development Economics, 79 (2):374{397.
Garg, A. and Morduch, J. (1998). Sibling rivalry and the gender gap: Evidence from child health
outcomes in ghana. Journal of Population Economics, 11:471{493.
Glick, P. (2008). What policies will reduce gender schooling gaps in developing countries: Evi-
dence and interpretation. World Development, 36(9):1623{1646.
Hersch, J. and Stratton, L. S. (1997). Housework, xed eects, and wages of married workers.
The Journal of Human Resources,, 32(2):285{307.
22INS and Macro, O. (2005). Enqute d emographique et de sant e, cameroun 2004. Rapport,
Institut National de la Statistique.
Kingdon, G. G. (1998). Does the labour market explain lower female schooling in india? The
Journal of Development Studies, 35(12):39{65.
Kingdon, G. G. (2002). The gender gap in educational attainment in india: how much can be
explained? The Journal of Development Studies, 39(2):25{53.
Kodde, D. A. (1986). Uncertainty and the demand for education. The Review of Economics
and Statistics, 68(3):460{67.
Lahiri, S. and Self, S. (2007). Gender bias in education: the role of inter-household externality,
dowry and other social institutions. Review of Development Economics, 11(4):591{606.
Lillard, L. A. and Willis, R. J. (1994). Intergenerational educational mobility: Eects and state
in malaysia. Journal of Human Resource, 29(4):1126{1166.
Lina, A., Simon, A., and John, K. (2006). Why do girls in rural china have lower school
enrollment? World Development, 34(9):1639{1653.
Manacorda, M. (2006). Child labor and the labor supply of other household members: Evidence
from 1920 america. American Economic Review, 96(5):1788{1801.
Mare, R. D. (1980). Social background ans school continuation decisions. Journal of the Amer-
ican Statistical Association, 75(370):295{305.
Munshi, K. and Rosenzweig, M. (2006). Traditional institutions meet the modern world:
Caste, gender, and schooling choice in a globalizing economy. American Economic Review,
96(4):1225{1252.
Orazem, P. and King, E. M. (2008). Schooling in developing countries: The roles of supply,
demand and government policy. in T. P. Schultz and John Strauss, Handbook of Development
Economics, vol 4:Elsevier Science, Amsterdam.
Pal, S. (2004). Child schooling in peru: Evidence from a sequential analysis of school progression.
Journal of Population Economics, 17(4):657{680.
Psacharopoulos, G. and Patrinos, H. A. (1997). Family size, schooling and child labor in peru -
an empirical analysis. Journal of Population Economics, 10(4):387{405.
Rosenzweig, M. R. and Schultz, T. P. (1982). Market opportunities, genetic endowments, and
intrafamily resource distribution: Child survival in rural india. American Economic Review,
72(4):803{15.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. The MIT
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
World-Bank (2008). World development indicators. Cd, The World Bank Group.
237 Appendix
Proof of proposition 2.
Proof.





QE(R   E )   Q






QE(R   E   t)   QEt
   Q
QEE(R   E   t)   QE(1   t
E)   QE
(12)
We suppose that Q is suciently concave so that
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24Table 9: Estimated coecients of the joint model on children aged 16
to 19.
Regularity is based on BEPC exam.
Regular? Enroll Irregular Enroll Regular
Age 0.299 -0.268 -0.200
(12.56)*** (7.67)*** (0.86)
Female -0.375 -0.498 -0.032
(4.91)*** (7.25)*** (0.11)
Head has primary level 0.246 0.272 -0.470
(2.68)*** (4.36)*** (1.07)
Head has secondary level 0.642 0.755 -0.001
(6.45)*** (10.05)*** (0.00)
Head has university level 0.860 1.007 0.030
(6.62)*** (7.76)*** (0.05)
Head sex (Male=1) -0.235 -0.291 -0.152
(3.80)*** (5.27)*** (0.77)
Estimated expenditure per head 0.110 0.071 0.062
(9.08)*** (5.15)*** (1.07)
Age of head 0.009 0.006 0.008
(3.12)*** (2.42)** (0.80)
Rural -0.402 0.053 -0.706
(3.67)*** (0.69) (2.22)**
Head or spouse non-wage worker -0.177 -0.170 -0.359
(2.22)** (2.30)** (1.68)*
Head or spouse (non-wage) in agri -0.006 0.112 0.420
(0.07) (1.47) (1.42)
Head or spouse (non-wage) in trade 0.090 0.073 0.079
(1.10) (1.04) (0.35)
Son/daughter of head 0.372 0.535 0.618
(6.32)*** (10.09)*** (3.26)***
Distance to private primary school -0.015 -0.005
(1.07) (0.78)
Distance to public primary school -0.064 -0.014
(1.96)** (0.80)
Distance to private secondary school -0.015 0.002 -0.015
(1.79)* (0.32) (0.64)
Distance to public secondary school -0.016 -0.046 -0.034
(1.20) (6.51)*** (0.84)
Local participation to labor market -0.232 -0.128 0.920
(1.10) (0.68) (1.37)
Local participation rate to informal sector 0.039 -0.264 -0.847
(0.21) (1.97)** (1.43)
# of 0-5 years -0.038 -0.077 -0.098
(1.39) (3.57)*** (1.23)
# of male of 6-11 years 0.008 -0.008 0.033
(0.24) (0.31) (0.32)
Continued on Next Page...
25Table 9 { Continued
Regular? Enroll Irregular Enroll Regular
# of female of 6-11 years 0.024 0.060 0.103
(0.77) (2.25)** (0.99)
# of male of 12-15 years 0.040 0.101 -0.153
(1.05) (3.11)*** (1.31)
# of female of 12-15 years 0.101 0.047 0.091
(2.77)*** (1.44) (0.75)
# of male of 16-19 years -0.004 0.102 -0.006
(0.11) (3.05)*** (0.06)
# of female of 16-19 years 0.143 0.243 0.067
(3.56)*** (6.26)*** (0.48)
# of male of 20-35 years 0.012 -0.058 -0.100
(0.48) (2.35)** (1.54)
# of female of 20-35 years 0.057 0.078 0.216
(1.80)* (2.77)*** (2.14)**
# of over 35 years -0.000 0.065 0.144
(0.01) (2.17)** (1.24)









e nrolled = 
F
enrolledpost 
2(1) = 2:31 p=0.12
The dependent variables Regular, Enrolled irregular and Enroll regular are all dummy variables. Regular takes value
1 if the individual have succeeded the BEPC exam. Enrolled irregular takes value 1 if the individual with no BEPC
is enrolled at school. Enrolled regular takes value 1 if the individual with BEPC is enrolled at school. Absolute
value of z statistics in parentheses. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
26Table 10: Estimated coecients of 3 probit models: Case of the CEP.
Regular Enroll irregular Enroll regular
Regular Enroll irregular Enroll regular
Age 0.366 -0.286 -0.116
(19.64)*** (11.14)*** (2.58)***
Female 0.108 -0.454 0.100
(1.76)* (5.33)*** (0.71)
Head has primary level 0.446 0.673 -0.090
(6.96)*** (8.99)*** (0.58)
Head has secondary level 0.851 0.957 0.205
(11.29)*** (8.75)*** (1.13)
Head has university level 1.040 0.929 0.220
(9.08)*** (4.12)*** (0.82)
Head sex (Male=1) -0.234 -0.423 0.169
(4.35)*** (5.02)*** (1.49)
Age of head 0.011 0.008 0.008
(5.06)*** (2.77)*** (1.56)
Muslim 0.004 -0.159 0.103
(0.08) (1.86)* (0.97)
Christian 0.375 0.800 0.178
(6.54)*** (9.87)*** (1.34)
Estimated expenditure per head 0.071 0.035 0.054
(6.41)*** (1.82)* (2.16)**
Rural -0.028 0.008 0.151
(0.38) (0.09) (0.92)
Head or spouse non-wage worker -0.065 0.029 -0.335
(0.95) (0.27) (2.25)**
Head or spouse (non-wage) in agri -0.093 -0.057 0.282
(1.30) (0.58) (1.76)*
Head or spouse (non-wage) in trade -0.098 -0.064 0.050
(1.47) (0.71) (0.35)
Son/daughter of head 0.066 0.388 0.478
(1.41) (5.76)*** (4.72)***
Distance to private primary school -0.036 -0.005
(5.00)*** (0.84)
Distance to public primary school -0.015 -0.017
(0.79) (1.60)
Distance to private secondary school -0.004 0.017
(0.65) (1.27)
Distance to public secondary school -0.039 -0.083
(5.49)*** (5.03)***
Local participation to labor market -0.130 0.114 -0.919
(0.74) (0.46) (2.27)**
Local participation rate to informal sector -0.065 -0.004 -0.133
(0.48) (0.02) (0.41)
# of 0-5 years -0.031 0.004 0.039
Continued on Next Page...
27Table 10 { Continued
Regular Enroll irregular Enroll regular
(1.54) (0.15) (0.83)
# of male of 6-11 years 0.011 0.016 -0.064
(0.47) (0.55) (1.18)
# of female of 6-11 years 0.035 -0.003 0.074
(1.49) (0.11) (1.28)
# of male of 12-15 years 0.068 0.056 0.020
(2.08)** (1.22) (0.26)
# of female of 12-15 years 0.042 -0.013 0.059
(1.31) (0.28) (0.79)
# of male of 16-19 years 0.035 0.003 0.078
(1.20) (0.06) (1.13)
# of female of 16-19 years 0.097 0.026 0.007
(3.03)*** (0.54) (0.09)
# of male of 20-35 years -0.009 0.054 -0.000
(0.40) (1.42) (0.01)
# of female of 20-35 years 0.035 0.020 -0.074
(1.29) (0.52) (1.21)
# of over 35 years -0.018 0.105 -0.026
(0.64) (2.79)*** (0.39)
Constant -6.320 3.255 2.740
(19.55)*** (7.50)*** (3.61)***
Observations 5067 2991 2076
The dependent variables Regular, Enrolled irregular and Enroll regular are all dummy variables. Regular takes value
1 if the individual have passed the CEP exam. Enrolled irregular takes value 1 if the individual with no CEP is
enrolled at school. Enrolled regular takes value 1 if the individual with CEP is enrolled at school. Absolute value of
z statistics in parentheses. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
28T
a
b
l
e
1
1
:
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
v
e
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
o
f
t
h
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
:
o
t
h
e
r
s
u
b
s
a
m
p
l
e
s
A
G
E
1
2
-
1
5
A
g
e
1
6
-
1
9
I
r
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
R
e
g
u
l
a
r
I
r
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
R
e
g
u
l
a
r
m
e
a
n
s
d
m
e
a
n
s
d
m
e
a
n
s
d
m
e
a
n
s
d
A
g
e
1
3
.
2
1
1
.
1
0
1
3
.
8
2
1
.
0
6
1
7
.
3
6
1
.
0
9
1
7
.
8
4
1
.
0
2
F
e
m
a
l
e
0
.
4
8
0
.
5
2
0
.
5
2
0
.
4
4
H
e
a
d
h
a
s
p
r
i
m
a
r
y
l
e
v
e
l
0
.
3
8
0
.
3
0
0
.
3
8
0
.
2
3
H
e
a
d
h
a
s
s
e
c
o
n
d
a
r
y
l
e
v
e
l
0
.
2
2
0
.
4
6
0
.
3
2
0
.
5
1
H
e
a
d
h
a
s
u
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
l
e
v
e
l
0
.
0
3
0
.
1
2
0
.
0
5
0
.
1
9
H
e
a
d
s
e
x
(
M
a
l
e
=
1
)
0
.
8
0
0
.
7
5
0
.
7
8
0
.
7
4
A
g
e
o
f
h
e
a
d
4
8
.
0
0
1
2
.
6
5
4
6
.
1
2
1
2
.
3
4
4
4
.
7
3
1
4
.
1
0
4
5
.
9
4
1
1
.
9
9
M
u
s
l
i
m
0
.
3
3
0
.
4
6
0
.
3
8
0
.
5
2
C
h
r
i
s
t
i
a
n
0
.
5
9
0
.
8
1
0
.
6
8
0
.
8
4
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
p
e
r
h
e
a
d
2
.
0
6
2
.
7
1
4
.
1
5
3
.
1
8
2
.
9
2
2
.
8
9
5
.
5
4
3
.
3
6
R
u
r
a
l
0
.
4
2
0
.
1
5
0
.
3
0
0
.
0
5
H
e
a
d
o
r
s
p
o
u
s
e
n
o
n
-
w
a
g
e
w
o
r
k
e
r
0
.
7
9
0
.
5
5
0
.
6
9
0
.
4
6
H
e
a
d
o
r
s
p
o
u
s
e
(
n
o
n
-
w
a
g
e
)
i
n
a
g
r
i
0
.
5
4
0
.
2
7
0
.
4
0
0
.
1
5
H
e
a
d
o
r
s
p
o
u
s
e
(
n
o
n
-
w
a
g
e
)
i
n
t
r
a
d
e
0
.
2
1
0
.
2
0
0
.
2
2
0
.
2
2
S
o
n
/
d
a
u
g
h
t
e
r
o
f
h
e
a
d
0
.
7
3
0
.
7
0
0
.
5
5
0
.
6
4
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
t
o
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
p
r
i
m
a
r
y
s
c
h
o
o
l
3
.
4
3
5
.
8
6
1
.
0
7
2
.
5
1
2
.
3
8
4
.
8
4
0
.
7
2
1
.
5
9
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
t
o
p
u
b
l
i
c
p
r
i
m
a
r
y
s
c
h
o
o
l
1
.
3
5
2
.
6
0
0
.
8
2
0
.
8
2
1
.
0
5
1
.
7
4
0
.
7
1
0
.
7
1
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
t
o
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
s
e
c
o
n
d
a
r
y
s
c
h
o
o
l
5
.
6
6
7
.
1
0
2
.
5
1
4
.
2
0
4
.
1
9
6
.
1
7
1
.
7
0
3
.
0
0
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
t
o
p
u
b
l
i
c
s
e
c
o
n
d
a
r
y
s
c
h
o
o
l
5
.
0
9
6
.
0
8
2
.
1
0
2
.
6
2
3
.
7
7
5
.
1
0
1
.
6
3
1
.
6
3
L
o
c
a
l
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
t
o
l
a
b
o
r
m
a
r
k
e
t
0
.
7
6
0
.
1
8
0
.
6
8
0
.
1
6
0
.
7
2
0
.
1
7
0
.
6
3
0
.
1
4
L
o
c
a
l
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
r
a
t
e
t
o
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
l
s
e
c
t
o
r
o
f
a
d
u
l
t
s
0
.
4
9
0
.
2
3
0
.
3
9
0
.
1
9
0
.
4
3
0
.
2
1
0
.
3
3
0
.
1
6
#
o
f
0
-
5
y
e
a
r
s
1
.
2
8
1
.
3
8
0
.
9
1
1
.
1
0
1
.
0
6
1
.
2
7
0
.
7
2
0
.
9
9
#
o
f
m
a
l
e
o
f
6
-
1
1
y
e
a
r
s
0
.
8
7
1
.
0
8
0
.
7
3
0
.
8
9
0
.
6
5
0
.
9
1
0
.
5
4
0
.
8
0
#
o
f
f
e
m
a
l
e
o
f
6
-
1
1
y
e
a
r
s
0
.
8
2
1
.
0
1
0
.
7
0
0
.
9
3
0
.
6
2
0
.
9
2
0
.
5
4
0
.
8
0
#
o
f
m
a
l
e
o
f
1
2
-
1
5
y
e
a
r
s
0
.
9
6
0
.
8
5
0
.
8
8
0
.
8
4
0
.
4
8
0
.
7
3
0
.
4
4
0
.
6
7
#
o
f
f
e
m
a
l
e
o
f
1
2
-
1
5
y
e
a
r
s
0
.
9
0
0
.
8
7
0
.
9
7
0
.
8
4
0
.
4
9
0
.
7
4
0
.
5
4
0
.
7
8
#
o
f
m
a
l
e
o
f
1
6
-
1
9
y
e
a
r
s
0
.
4
2
0
.
7
2
0
.
4
9
0
.
7
7
0
.
8
8
0
.
9
2
0
.
9
7
0
.
8
4
#
o
f
f
e
m
a
l
e
o
f
1
6
-
1
9
y
e
a
r
s
0
.
3
8
0
.
6
4
0
.
4
8
0
.
7
1
0
.
8
5
0
.
7
7
0
.
8
6
0
.
8
5
#
o
f
m
a
l
e
o
f
2
0
-
3
5
y
e
a
r
s
0
.
5
1
0
.
8
7
0
.
5
9
0
.
9
9
0
.
7
1
0
.
9
5
0
.
8
2
1
.
1
9
#
o
f
f
e
m
a
l
e
o
f
2
0
-
3
5
y
e
a
r
s
0
.
7
3
0
.
8
9
0
.
7
4
0
.
8
2
0
.
6
6
0
.
8
7
0
.
7
2
0
.
9
0
#
o
f
o
v
e
r
3
5
y
e
a
r
s
1
.
6
8
1
.
0
3
1
.
5
6
0
.
9
6
1
.
4
7
1
.
0
8
1
.
5
6
0
.
9
6
2
9
9
1
2
0
7
6
3
7
0
0
8
1
8
T
h
e
m
e
a
n
o
f
a
d
u
m
m
y
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
s
p
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
.
29B.P. 48
L-4501 Differdange
Tél.: +352 58.58.55-801
www.ceps.lu